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Abstract 
Developmental evaluation questions the ethical basis of an intervention in terms of 
whether it’s ‘doing the right thing’ rather than merely ‘doing things right’.  But 
developmental evaluation invites a space for exploring not only ethical but also 
political issues associated particularly with equity-focused evaluations. Drawing on 
ideas from critical systems thinking (CST) and critical systems heuristics, an 
evaluation framework with a pro-equity focus is suggested.   The framework 
addresses issues of complex interrelationships, invites theory of change associated 
with philosophical ethics, and provides a means of surfacing, and potentially 
transforming, debilitating relations of power in a complex evaluand. A case study of 
the long-standing Narmada project in India is used to illustrate the workings of 
proposed framework. The paper describes how the underpinning methodological ideas 
of CST incorporating triple-loop learning can enhance the practice of developmental 
evaluation.   
Keywords: developmental evaluation, ethics, critical systems thinking, critical 
systems heuristics, theory of change, triple-loop learning.  
Introduction 
In evaluating questions of equity - access to resources (who gets what?) – attention is 
often diverted from related questions of power (who owns what?) and questions of 
knowledge (who does what?). Moreover these questions relate to important questions 
regarding legitimacy (who gets affected by what some people get?). Such ethical and 
political questions are not easy to grasp or work with in terms of an approach to 
equity-focused evaluations of interventions.  Developmental evaluation provides one 
particular response (for example, see Paton, 2012).   The present paper suggests ideas 
from a tradition of critical systems thinking (CST) which provide a complementary 
enhancement for the space suggested by developmental evaluation for addressing 
ethical issues. By way of illustration, the paper refers to a pro-equity evaluation of the 
Narmada dams project in India (originally presented in Reynolds and Williams, 
2012).   
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After providing a short description of the case study, the paper continues in three 
parts.  The first explores two key methodological issues associated with evaluating the 
intervention – (i) equity as an ethical focus of evaluation and its expression through 
theory of change, and (ii) issues of developmental evaluation and its shortcomings, 
particularly as a learning process for dealing with political issues. The second part 
explores how CST may add value in dealing with issues of an equity-focused 
developmental evaluation. A dominant expression of CST is critical systems 
heuristics (CSH) - a toolbox of twelve questions helpful for evaluating complex 
situations from different stakeholder perspectives. The third part of the paper outlines 
the application of CSH  for the equity-focused evaluation of the Narmada project.2  
 
Case study: Narmada project 
 
The Narmada project in India was conceived in the 1940s by India’s first Prime 
minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, but it was not until 1979 that the project took form. It is 
better described as a long-term programme involving many individual projects 
associated with the construction of dams along the Narmada River which forms the 
traditional barrier between North and South India.3 The project involves the 
construction of 30 large, 135 medium and 3000 small dams to exploit the waters of 
the river and its tributaries. Of the 30 large dams, Sardar Sarovar is the largest and 
most controversial. In 1979, the Sardar Sarovar Project was proposed and attracted 
initial support from international financial institutions including the World Bank. But 
after much controversy and protest, particularly since the late 1980s, many financial 
institutions withdrew support. Protest was led by Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), a 
national coalition movement including people affected by the project, environmental 
and human rights activists, scientists and academics. 
 
The construction of Sardar Sarovar dam itself was stopped in the mid-1990s.  
However, in October 2000, the Indian Supreme Court gave a go-ahead again for the 
construction of the dam.  Other dams associated with the wider Narmada project have 
likewise been developing, come under criticism and have been the subject of protest.  
 
Four general issues or dilemmas emerging from the Narmada project can be 
summarised:  
 Water security:  water access and quality (verses water-borne diseases from ensuing 
stagnant reservoir waters) 
 Energy security:  urban and rural economic development (verses displaced 
populations from rural areas) 
 Food security:  change in agricultural practices and shift towards large-scale 
irrigated farming (verses demise of small holdings) 
                                               
2 Detail findings from the actual application of CSH to the Narmada project are not documented here 
but can be found in the corresponding paper (Reynolds and Williams, 2012) available as a free 
download from either the parent compilation published by UNICEF or as an individual chapter.   
3 Ethical issues of  the Narmada case study are discussed more fully in Reynolds, M. (2009) 
"Environmental Ethics" pp. 40-51 in The Environmental Responsibility Reader, edited by Martin 
Reynolds, Chris Blackmore and Mark Smith. London, New York Zed Books  
 Sustainability:  national prosperity (verses ecological impacts particularly the. loss 
of biodiversity in previously rich hydrological systems) 
 
Equity issues loom large and potential and actual conflicts in an evaluation of such 
projects are formidable.  
 
Two methodological issues 
An equity-focused developmental evaluation invites some clarification of two issues: 
the ethical focus and the developmental process.   
 
Equity and ethics  
 
Equity is an ethic; a normative judgement regarding the distribution of ‘goods’ and 
‘bads’ associated with an intervention. Pro-equity interventions – whether projects, 
programmes, or policy directly, or whether equity-focused evaluations on 
interventions – seek to redress uneven distribution. More precisely, a pro-equity 
intervention would seek to redress the imbalance of goods and bads commonly 
skewed against stakeholders along lines of socio-economic class, gender, sexuality, 
age, physical and mental capacities, geographic location (ranging from disadvantaged 
regions of the global South to impoverished local ghettos in any country), etc. Such 
groups are variously referred to as marginalised, disadvantaged, and/or vulnerable. In 
the UNICEF publication on ‘Evaluation for equitable development results’ they are 
generically termed “worst-off groups” (Bamberger and Segone, 2012 p.3). 
 
 Intuitively, ethics is about ‘being good’ or ‘doing the right thing’. So we might say 
that an ethic on equity is about not treating the worst-off groups badly or wrongfully. 
At its simplest, ethics concerns what ought to be, as opposed to what is. Joseph Des 
Jardins uses the terms normative and philosophical to distinguish between different 
ethical traditions (Des Jardins, 2001, pp. 18–19): 
 
To make ethical judgements, give advice, and offer evaluations of what ought or 
should be is to engage with normative ethics […] Normative judgements prescribe 
behaviour. ‘Pesticide use should be reduced.’ ‘Factories ought not pollute the air 
and water.’ ‘Endangered species ought to be protected.’ […] Normative disputes 
can be frustrating when ethical discussions are left at this level, with disagreements 
and controversies abounding […] Philosophical ethics […] is a higher level of 
generality and abstraction in which we analyze and evaluate normative judgements 
and their supporting reasons. This is the level of the general concepts, principles, 
and theories to which we appeal in defending and explaining normative claims. 
Normative ethics deal with value judgements.  So for Narmada, some examples of 
normative judgements might be associated with each of the four key issues (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Narmada project : normative value judgements on construction of dams 
 
 
 
 
 
But what are the deeper theoretical stories – theories of change – underpinning these 
normative judgements? Philosophical ethics deal more with theoretical underpinnings 
associated with doing what’s good (consequentialist ethics) doing what’s right 
(deontological ethics) and being responsible (virtue-based ethics).  Similarly, the three 
ethical traditions can be expressed in relation to an equity-focused evaluation of 
Narmada: 
 
(i) A consequentialist ethic (e.g. emphasising utilization) considers good and bad 
(harmful) to be drivers of ethical action. It is the consequences of an action that 
determine a response to the moral dilemma of whether it is right or wrong.  
What are the particular issues that need attention and how might they be related with 
each other? What are the interrelationships and interdependencies amongst securities 
for water, energy and food and what particular impact do they have on worst-off 
groups? 
(ii) A deontological ethic (e.g. emphasising human rights) considers right and wrong 
to be independent of consequences. It focuses on the moral dilemma of duty – the 
rightness or wrongness of actions themselves – as opposed to the consequences of 
those actions.  
How might the key issues be attended to and by whom? Is it just ‘them’ out there or is 
it also you/ me/ ‘us’? Whose perspectives are relevant to these issues and what 
realistic role might different stakeholders have in making their perspectives count? 
How for example may the views of vulnerable groups like pastoralist farmers or other 
less powerful, and often the most worst-off, members of displaced communities such 
as women, the disabled, and children, be given expression?   
 
  
  
(iii) A virtue-based ethic (e.g. emphasising social justice) considers character 
formation to be a determining factor in addition to either calculations of 
consequence or the rightness or wrongness of the action itself. It focuses on the 
moral dilemma of character – virtue or vice (being virtuous or vicious).  
Why are some issues privileged more than others, and some ways of dealing with 
them prioritised over others?  What opportunities are there for challenging 
mainstream ways of dealing with harmfulness and wrongdoing?  What attributes of 
expert behaviour and expert-driven solutions to poverty-alleviation prevail?   
 
Table 2 illustrates the consequentialist and deontological ethical aspects of the Narmada 
project and some particular virtues and vices associated with each of the four key issues. 
 
Table 2  Ethical issues in the Narmada project  
 
 
 
 
While equity is essentially a consequentialist ethic - its primary focus being on impact 
(distribution of goods/bads) - equity is also clearly related to the deontological ethic of 
human rights (who gets what?), and the virtue-based behavioural ethic of social 
justice (why should some get less?).  An equity-focused evaluation requires attention 
to normative value judgements about what ought to be, and to underpinning 
assumptions associated with all three ethical theoretical traditions. So how might 
developmental evaluation provide guidance towards enabling this ethical focus? 
 
Developmental evaluation  
 
Whilst evaluation is conventionally about applying value judgements, evaluation 
might also be considered as a contributor towards developing value judgements.  
From a developmental perspective equity is not regarded as some fixed point of 
nirvana, subject to endless academic discourse on what constitutes it’s absolute 
essence, but rather a construct or emergent property in the making.4   
 
Developmental evaluation was given expression in the 1990s by Michael Patton as an 
example of utilization-focused evaluations (Patton, 1994; 2010; 2012). The key idea 
behind developmental evaluation is that in dealing specifically with complex 
situations of change and uncertainty (involving unintended consequences and 
unforeseen events) there is a need for attending to emergent issues characteristic of 
complex interventions.  Developmental evaluation itself might be regarded as having 
emergent qualities – the need to be adaptive to changing circumstances using different 
approaches – summative and formative – and applying different methods – 
quantitative and qualitative – relevant to the change in circumstances.  
 
The focus in developmental evaluation is on how to change systems.  Patton here 
makes particular reference to the importance of double-loop learning:  
 
“Social innovators and social entrepreneurs, especially those working on 
issues of human rights and equity, are typically trying to bring about 
fundamental changes in systems to change the world.  To do so, they have to 
understand how the system they want to change is operating and to make the 
changes that change the system itself, by getting beyond temporary and 
surface solutions […] Making changes to improve immediate outcomes is 
single-loop learning; making changes to the system to prevent the problem or 
embed the solution in a changed system is double-loop learning” (Patton, 2012 
p.105-106).  
 
The contrast with single-loop learning is exemplified by Patton with the quick-fix 
scenario associated with linear ‘formative evaluation’ in problem–identification–
correction processes. So in the case of the Narmada project, single-loop learning 
might be seen with a superficial viewing that long-standing problems of development 
are first identified with water security, energy security and food security. Building 
large-scale dams arguably provide some clear immediate solutions to correct each of 
the three ‘problems’. Whilst not being literally a ‘quick-fix’ solution there is an 
associated technical-fix to such thinking that makes such systems of intervention 
simple and appealing. 
 
Another example of the pervasiveness and weakness of single-loop learning in the 
context of India is with long standing traditions of evaluating famine. Typically, 
symptomatic problems of famine are identified – for example, regarding famine in 
terms of food shortage - and corrected, in terms of, say, improving charitable supply 
and distribution of more food. The main issue with such evaluations is in not looking 
at the underlying multiple and deep rooted causes of famine.  The Nobel Economist, 
Amartya Sen, provided an excellent equity-focused evaluation of the 1940s  Bengal 
famine in India with his exploration of entitlements (Sen, 1981).  Rather than 
regarding famine as a result of drought causing a shortage of food – a prevailing 
perspective on causality at the time - Sen signalled the deeper causes associated with 
                                               
4 Here I extend the constructivist traditions in ethics as depicted by Michael Freeden (1991) in terms of 
deontological ‘rights’ development, and Amartya Sen (2009) in terms of a developmental idea of the 
virtue-based ethic of ‘justice’.   
the political-economy of India and the lack of widespread democratic rights which 
affected peoples’ sense of entitlement.   
 
The profound learning from Sen is that famines cannot occur in democracies. The 
famine example raises questions about ways of enhancing developmental evaluation. 
Firstly, to what degree is developmental evaluation equipped to actually reveal the 
interrelationships of complex situations - why interventions work or not, to what 
effect, for whom, and in what circumstances?  Secondly, how might developmental 
evaluation work with other evaluation tools associated with pro-equity evaluation 
including theory of change, programme theory, values-engaged evaluations, and 
systems thinking?  Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly for pro-equity evaluation, 
to what degree might developmental evaluation challenge the relations of power that 
underpin interventions and indeed the evaluations of interventions? 
 
Developmental evaluation is part of a wider set of utilization-focused evaluations 
where there is a risk of not questioning the purposes of an evaluation.  The utility is 
often that mandated by the client alone. This is borne out in the claim that 
developmental evaluation is not relevant to all situations: “The ideal is to match the 
type of evaluation to the situation and the needs of the intended users to achieve their 
intended uses” (Patton, 2012 p.113).  But it is often the stated purposes of clients that 
need questioning, particularly for an equity-focused evaluation of an existing 
intervention.  So how might systems thinking, and particularly ideas from critical 
systems thinking, help with addressing such issues?  
 
Critical systems thinking (CST) 
 
“The core aspects of systems thinking are gaining a bigger picture (going up a 
level of abstraction) and appreciating other people’s perspectives” (Chapman 
2004 p. 14)  
 
Systems thinking is gaining currency in the evaluation field primarily to assess 
complex interventions. The emphasis has been on understanding how multiple factors 
and actors within situations behave in relation to each other. Developmental 
evaluation, for example, embraces a type of systems thinking associated with complex 
adaptive systems.  Such systems are regarded as holistic entities representing what 
Jake Chapman refers to as ‘a bigger picture’. However, systems from a critical 
systems thinking tradition provides two other attributes. One, as Chapman implies, 
involves engaging with multiple perspectives. The other requires critically reflecting 
on judgements made about system boundaries. Such boundary issues relate to 
potential ethical conflict and associated power relations amongst different entities 
and/or perspectives (Churchman, 1979; Ulrich, 1983).  
 
Systems practitioners associated with the evaluation community have identified the 
influence of these three attributes as a confluence of three concepts - 
interrelationships, perspectives and boundaries (Midgley, 2007; Williams and Imam, 
2007; and Williams and Hummulbrunner, 2010).  Elsewhere I have reconfigured these 
three conceptual underpinnings in terms of a framework for supporting corporate 
responsibility:  
 
“A critical systems framework constitutes three distinct though interrelated 
(sub)frameworks: firstly, a framework for understanding …complex 
interrelationships and interdependencies; secondly, a framework for practice 
… when engaging with different perspectives; and thirdly, a composite 
framework for responsibility  [and reflection]… in dealing ethically [and 
politically] with inevitable limitations on being holistically ‘universe’ and 
pluralistically ‘multiverse’.”   (Reynolds, 2008 p.385) 
 
This framing of critical systems thinking (CST) with systems thinking has more 
recently been expressed in terms of a learning device; a systems thinking in practice 
heuristic (Reynolds, 2011). The heuristic can be more simply understood in terms of 
three purposeful orientations for the use of CST in any intervention: 
 
(i) Understanding interrelationships associated with a situation;  
(ii) Engaging with contrasting perspectives regarding a situation, and 
(iii) Reflecting on boundaries of such representations and interactions  
 
Relating these activities to the Narmada project reveals how issues of ethics and 
developmental evaluation might be addressed.  
 
Interrelationships   
 
Normative and associated theoretical ethical issues of doing ‘good’, doing ‘right’ and 
being virtuous, all with respect to worst-off groups associated with the Narmada 
project (Tables 1 and 2) can be  reconfigured in terms of addressing three interrelated 
systemic stakeholder questions: 
 
(a) What is at stake? (…doing good) 
(b) Who are the stakeholders? (…doing right) 
(c) What possibilities exist for improving stakeholdings? (…being virtuous) 
 
Questions on what’s at stake may focus on the four general issues (water, energy, and 
food security, and sustainability) and associated consequentialist issues regarding the 
impact of intervention – what should happen?  Questions regarding agency and the 
key stakeholders, both involved and affected, relate to rights-based deontological 
issues – who should do what?  
 
Related questions regarding stakeholding address wider behavioural changes manifest 
in either vicious or virtuous cycles. So for example, what fears might there be for 
perpetuating existing vicious cycles with entrenchment of inequities amongst different 
stakeholders, particularly with respect to disparate access to land and water resources? 
Conversely, what opportunities might there be for developing alternative virtuous 
systems that may challenge and change conventional ways of thinking about, say, 
issues of access to natural resources?   
 
Stakes, stakeholders and stakeholdings interrelate. In Narmada for example, one thing 
at stake from, say, changes in agricultural practice through the construction of dams, 
could be traditional rural lifestyles. This will affect different stakeholders in different 
ways. From a national government bureaucratic stakeholder perspective, the 
stakeholding could be related to the potential uneconomic nature of patchworks of 
small landholdings, whereas from an existing farmer-landlord stakeholder 
perspective, the stakeholding might be related to the non-commercial values of 
communal property resource management.   
 
Similar interrelated systemic questions of political economy need addressing – 
questions relating to power, knowledge, and legitimacy. As with questions of ‘value’, 
questions of power, knowledge and legitimacy each need addressing issues of what’s 
at stake, who the stakeholders might be, and what opportunities and constraints exist 
for stakeholding development. In any mapping of interrelationships from a CST 
viewpoint, it is important to take on board and map out composite ethical and political 
relationships.   
 
From a CST viewpoint, the resulting map is itself a system – a human construct – and 
should not be confused with the actual territory – the situation or evaluand being 
represented by the system’s map or model.  Hence for CST ‘systems’ can be regarded 
as themselves representative of ‘perspectives’ on situations.  This is a significant point 
of departure from viewing systems as real world entities as depicted through much of 
the developmental evaluation literature based on complexity theory as well as related 
ideas on ‘evaluating the complex’ (cf. Forss et al, 2011). 
 
Perspectives   
 
Any one ‘big picture’ or systems map or model gained by an evaluator can only 
represent a partial perspective.  Developmental evaluation appreciates this point by 
encouraging stakeholder participation in the evaluation process.  From a ‘soft’ and 
‘critical’ systems standpoint, such perspectives can be actively expressed, analysed 
and used as a discursive tool through separate systems modelling.  Peter Checkland 
has been particularly influential in developing systems modelling for generating 
purposeful discussion involving multiple stakeholders (e.g., Checkland and Poulter, 
2006).  With this in mind he wanted to simplify the process of understanding different 
perspectives by using a shorthand form of conceptual systems modelling. Rosalind 
Armson develops Checkland’s systems modelling technique further in simplifying 
systems of perspective using Checkland’s three questions – what? how? and why? 
(Armson, 2011 pp.213-238).  Armson recognises the issue of conflicting perspectives  
based upon different levels of perceiving the situation.  
 
Taking one of many examples, reference is made to a proposed organisational 
restructuring intervention for the Police Forces in the UK, and the suggested 
formation of  an American style Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). When Armson 
asks the question “to what problem is this a solution?” she is signalling a disconnect 
between a ‘what’ and a ‘why’.  The ‘solution’ provides the ‘what’ at one lower 
systemic level, but at a higher level the ‘what’ in the question is actually asking for a 
‘why’.  Making these explicit can help to avoid ‘talking at cross-purposes’. 
 
With the Narmada project we might for example identify 4 different systems 
according to particular national State interests and primary and secondary purposes 
(Table 3). 
 
   
Table 3 India State perspectives on the Narmada project 
Gujaret 
‘what’ Primary:  secure irrigation and drinking water 
Secondary: secure hydroelectric power 
‘how’ Dam construction ; particularly Sardar Sarovar 
‘why’ Very poor rainfall and need for more industrial development 
 
Madhya Pradesh 
‘what’ Primary:  prevent water loss to neighbouring States 
Secondary: limit displacement of villages 
‘how’ Limited and controlled dam construction with attention to appropriate just 
recompense measures for displacement 
‘why’ River Narmada runs mostly through MP.  193 villages out of total of 245 
would be submerged by Sardar Sarovar alone 
 
Maharasthra 
‘what’ Primary:  secure hydroelectric power 
Secondary: limit displacement of villages 
‘how’ Build higher dam wall at Sardar Sarovar with attention to appropriate just 
recompense measures for displacement 
‘why’ Prominent industrial area but needing a check on rural to urban migration 
 
Rajasthan 
‘what’ Primary:  secure irrigation supply 
Secondary: none (not directly in Narmada Valley) 
‘how’ Build higher dam wall at Sardar Sarovar and build canal network 
‘why’ Prominent agricultural area in South West but with very poor rainfall 
 
The simple perspectives captured above are all ‘ideal’ expressions of different 
systems, each expressing explicit normative value judgements – ‘what ought to be’ – 
from particular State perspectives. Other  normative positions might similarly be 
expressed from higher system levels; say, a national or even an international/ global 
perspective.  
 
Whichever system level is in focus, viewpoints might be further disaggregated in 
accordance with particular stakeholder perspectives including those involved 
(intended clients, decision makers, experts) and those potentially affected negatively 
(typically, worst-off groups) by the intervention.    
 
Still other perspectives might emerge from the more critical ‘factual’ descriptive 
analysis – ‘what is’. For an equity-focused evaluation the critique of ‘ought’ with ‘is’ 
may helpfully draw on philosophical ideas associated with the three ethical traditions 
– consequentialist, rights-based, and virtue-based.   
 
 
  
Boundaries  
 
From a CST viewpoint, purposeful systems (as described above) are perspectives. As 
such they are variable and, as with all systems, subject to change. The ‘what’ and 
‘why’ are not fixed (as in mechanical purposive systems) but rather emergent (as in 
all human purposeful systems). The emergence arises from system boundaries being 
continually - and healthily - subject to challenge and revision. 
 
All systems are partial. Mapping out interrelationships and modelling perspectives are 
not neutral activities– someone somewhere decides where to place boundaries, and 
which of these bounded systems are most important. So any systems design is partial 
with respect to being both holistic (what’s in and left out in terms of endless 
interrelationships) and pluralistic (whose interests ‘count’ and whose are discounted 
in terms of multiple perspectives). 
 
Defining boundaries is an essential part of systems thinking. A boundary 
differentiates between what is “in” and what is “out”, what is deemed “relevant” and 
“irrelevant”, what is important and what is unimportant, who “benefits” and who is 
“disadvantaged”. With systems thinking in practice heuristic boundaries are always 
provisional, and subject to change.  It is in this sense, when applied to the process of 
evaluation, that reflective practice is most closely associated with developmental 
evaluation and particularly to ideas of double-loop learning. Patton goes on to 
describe developmental evaluation as triple-loop learning - learning how to learn 
(Patton, 2012, p.106). From a CST viewpoint, triple-loop learning deals more 
explicitly with relations of power. 
 
Flood and Romm (1996) offer an explanation of triple-loop learning in the tradition of 
CST which captures the political extension of ethical issues. Whereas single-loop 
learning questions how existing activities can be done better – relating to the 
normative ethical dimension in asking how we should do what we do, double-loop 
learning goes one step further and questions whether those activities are the right 
thing to do – relating to the philosophical dimension of asking what things are best to 
do and why. Triple-loop learning takes a further analytical step and questions how we 
know what is the right thing to do.  Is it primarily influenced by the power of decision 
makers – those in control of resources (mightiness), or is it influenced more by the 
power of academic argument (rightness)? 
 
This gives rise to questions of politics; an examination of the relationship between 
power and knowledge, between ‘mightiness’ and ‘rightness’.  So evaluators involved 
with triple-loop learning might gauge whether the ‘right thing’ is determined more by 
some source of coercion or authoritative power of government (sometimes referred to 
as ‘decisionism’) or determined by some power of authoritative knowledge, expertise 
and/or righteousness (sometimes referred to as expertocracy or technocentrism).  
 
For example, in the Narmada project ethical questions might be raised with respect to 
the influence of large multinational companies involved with agribusiness in forcing 
decisions around dam construction using their leverage of financial power, even in the 
face of expert knowledge advising against intervention because of the ecological 
damage. Alternatively, expertise itself can be regarded as assuming excessive power. 
So in the Narmada situation, there is considerable expertise around dam construction, 
particularly amongst multinational building contractors, as well as knowledge 
associated with other dam constructions. Such expertise can assume a technocentric 
power base of arrogant ‘rightness’ overriding the ‘mightiness’ of, say, ecological 
interests and vast numbers of people who stand to be adversely affected by dam 
construction in the Narmada Valley. 
 
Ethics itself might be considered as providing an intuitive ‘mightiness’ in terms of 
unquestioned normative value judgements and perspectives accumulated and passed 
on through generations by cultural practices. The more formal side associated with 
philosophical ethics has provided an accumulated knowledge base of ‘rightness’. 
Since the eighteenth-century Enlightenment in Western culture, deeper questions 
about being virtuous have been largely offset by more tangible questions regarding 
doing good and doing the right thing. Indeed, the term ‘ethics’ is often used in 
connection with professional codes of conduct, as with business and medical ethics. 
The multitude of ethical ‘committees’ that have sprung up in contemporary times are 
principally charged with providing guidance on action. This notion of doing ethics has 
been prevalent in the political space used for addressing issues of equity. 
 
Platforms for deliberating on ethical issues can be found at all levels of society, from 
individual conversations to households, local communities and a wide variety of 
regional, national and other international forums. Political space can be of a less 
formal type that support, for example, non-violent direct action, or have more 
formalised manifestations, as with the establishment of mainstream local, national and 
international government bodies, private sector affiliations and NGOs. The Narmada 
Bachao Andolan (NBA) coalition provides a particularly significant space for 
alternative expressions of values, perspectives and ethical traditions. 
 
 
Critical systems heuristics and CST 
 
Critical systems heuristics (CSH) represents one of two recognised strands of CST 
(Ulrich, 2003)5. CSH provides a reference system comprising a set of tools – twelve 
CSH questions – which can be used for any evaluation.  The task for an evaluator is to 
translate the intervention being evaluated into a bounded CSH reference system.  
 
In CSH boundaries make up what is called a reference system. A CSH reference 
system cultivates a more holistic awareness of situations with regard to wide-ranging 
stakeholder issues associated with four sources of influence. The CSH reference 
system addresses issues of: 
 
(i)  values and motivations built into our views of situations and efforts to 
'improve' them (who gets what?);  
(ii) power structures influencing what is considered a 'problem' and what may 
be done about it (who owns what?);  
(iii) the knowledge basis defining what counts as relevant information and 
skills (who does what?); and  
(iv) the moral basis on which we expect third parties (i.e., people not involved 
yet in some way concerned) to bear with the consequences of what we do, 
or fail to do, about the situations in question (who gets affected in the 
process, and with what justification?). 
 
In CSH, these four dimensions of a complex situation are called sources of 
motivation, control, knowledge, and legitimacy, respectively (see column 'sources of 
influence' in Table 4).  Each of the four sources of influence have three bounded 
questions regarding who the stakeholders might be, what’s at stake, and what might 
be the particular stakeholding issues associated with the particular stakeholder group.  
Thus there are a total of twelve boundary judgements to be made regarding any 
situation being examined.  The complex situation of interest (for example, an 
intervention such as a policy, programme or project) is effectively translated into a 
more manageable system of interest. Table 4 outlines the 12 boundary judgements 
associated with CSH.  Some of the judgements originally phrased by Ulrich are more 
challenging than others to appreciate, hence my inclusion of alternative wordings in 
parentheses.  
 
                                               
5 The other strand is called Total Systems Intervention but is not relevant to this paper. 
Table 4: Boundary judgements as questions relating to CSH 
(adapted from Ulrich and Reynolds, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
Details on how the CSH questions can be used for an evaluation in general can be 
found in Reynolds (2007). Specific exemplars on how CSH has been applied to the 
Narmada project as part of an equity-focused evaluation are provided in Reynolds and 
Williams (2012).   
 
The following provides a rough sketch on features of CSH as used in the evaluation 
using the parameters of a CST-informed evaluation as described above. 
 
CSH:  understanding interrelationships 
 
The twelve CSH questions prompt an understanding of the ‘bigger picture’. In an 
equity-focused inquiry, it provides a way of organising normative values into a 
common reference system (sometimes referred to as a ‘system of interest’).  The 
relationships between the four sources of influence can be explained through a 
narrative.  Figure 1 below illustrates the narrative in terms of the suggested 
sequencing between the twelve boundary questions associated with CSH.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 unfolding narrative of 12 CSH questions 
(adapted from Reynolds, 2007 p. 109) 
 
The narrative in Box 1 below was developed by Reynolds and Ulrich (Reynolds, 2007 
p.107; Ulrich and Reynolds, 2010 pp. 260-261) and is further adapted here from 
Reynolds and Williams (2012 pp.120-121) 
  
Box 1 Narrative of an unfolding reference system associated with CSH   
(adapted from Reynolds and Williams, 2012 pp.120-121) 
 
Motivation 
The development of a system - whether it’s an intervention itself (e.g., a project, 
programme or policy) or an evaluation of an intervention - starts with some notion of 
“purpose.”  Since a purpose reflects embedded values associated with some person or 
persons, it is valid to ask, “Whose purpose?”  Identifying first what the purpose of the 
system should be helps identify who the intended beneficiaries ought to be. This in 
turn raises questions about what should be appropriate measures of success in 
securing some improvement to those beneficiaries.  
 
Control 
The exploration of motivation leads to questions regarding the necessary resources or 
components needed for success. Financial capital and other forms of tangible assets 
like natural, physical, and human capital might be complemented with less tangible 
factors such as social capital (access to networks of influence). But who ought to be 
the decision makers in control of such resources? This in turn prompts questions as to 
what should be left outside the control of such decision makers in order to ensure 
some level of accountability. There are risks of having all the necessary resources 
under the control of the system.  If the system has all the resources, then the system 
cannot be controlled or held accountable in any way by those outside the system.  In 
other words, a decision has to be made about what should be part of the system’s 
decision environment in order to keep it in check and accountable?   
 
Knowledge 
One important set of factors that need to be independent of the decision maker is 
knowledge or expertise. In an ideal setting, knowledge (including expertise) ought not 
to be under the control of the decision maker but should have independence.  So what 
ought to be the necessary types and levels of knowledge and experiential know-how 
to ensure that the system actually has practical applicability and works toward its 
purpose within the decision making environment?  Who ought to provide such 
expertise?  The whole point of having experts is to provide some informal warranty or 
assurance for success.  So the question is, how might such expert support provide 
some promise as an effective guarantor?  Conversely this requires evaluators to look 
out for false guarantors; a reliance on experts or expertise that may turn out to be 
unwise or misleading.   
 
Legitimacy 
Any assessment of the values (motivation), power (control), and expertise 
(knowledge) associated with any system will always be biased in some way.  So what 
gives this system the legitimacy to carry out its tasks? Churchman (1979) considered 
that a system could not legitimise itself.  Legitimacy is awarded by those outside 
system.  In particular it must withstand critical assessment.  In other words, if the 
system is looked at from a different, opposing viewpoint, in what ways might the 
system’s activities be considered as marginalising particular interests? How might it 
be coercive or malignant rather than emancipatory or benign?  Who or what interest 
groups are likely to be the “victims” of the system, and, importantly, what type of 
representation ought to be made on their behalf? That is, who is capable of making 
representations on the victims’ behalf, and on what basis would they make this claim?  
Finally, how might the underlying worldview associated with the system be 
reconciled with these opposing worldviews? Where might representation of opposing 
views be expressed, and what action ought to happen as a result?  
 
 
Boundary questions relating to ‘motivation’ -  purpose, beneficiaries and relevant 
measures - make transparent the value basis of the Narmada project. Questions 
relating to ‘control’ – resources, decision-makers, and the decision making 
environment - help make transparent the power basis of the system. Questions 
regarding ‘knowledge’ - what expertise is deemed important, who might be the 
experts, and what promises of assurance underpin such expertise and experts - help to 
make transparent  the knowledge basis of the system.  Finally, questions regarding 
social ‘legitimacy’ - the need for emancipation and freedom from the negative affects 
of an intervention, who may act as representatives or be witness to such effects, and 
opportunities for contrasting  worldviews to be given expression to reshape such 
effects - help to make transparent the moral meaning underpinning the system. This in 
turn provides the basis of legitimacy; a sense of social and legal approval to the 
system at any one time.  
 
In the first part of the evaluation of the Narmada project, these questions were 
addressed in a normative ‘ought’ mode (Reynolds and Williams, 2010 pp. 123-128). 
So for example what conditions of success ought to be outside the control of the 
decision maker? (CSHq6) and who ought to be providing relevant knowledge and 
skills (CSHq7).  
 
CSH:  engaging with multiple perspectives 
 
In the second stage, CSH questions are asked in the descriptive mode inviting 
contrasting perspectives through a critique of ‘ought’ against ‘is’ – normative against 
descriptive.  Such a critique can itself draw upon different perspectives.  Table 5 
provides a generic template grid for addressing such questions. 
 
 
 
Table 5 CSH grid for recording perspectives 
(adapted from Ulrich, 1996) 
 
 
 
The three traditions of philosophical ethics provide a helpful platform for addressing 
such critiques in a pro-equity evaluation. For example, CSH questions regarding 
what’s at stake (CSHq2, 5, 8, and 11) can draw on consequentialist ethics regarding 
the impact of the intervention from different perspectives – motivation, decision 
making, expert support, and moral/ social legitimacy. Questions regarding who the 
stakeholders might actually be (CSHq1, 4, 7, and 10) can draw on deontological 
ethics regarding who actually have particular rights in the intervention and how such 
rights/ entitlements might be exercised. Questions regarding stakeholding (CSHq3, 6, 
9, and 12) can draw on theories of virtue-based ethics addressing whether, and to what 
degree, particular stakeholders may find themselves entrapped or liberated by their 
own stakeholder patterns of behaviour.   
 
For an equity-focused evaluation particular attention is given to the perspectives of 
worst-off groups who traditionally lie outside the core system boundaries (i.e., those 
affected but not involved – CSHq10-12) in contrast to the perspective of those 
involved (CSHq1-9). 
 
The critique of the Narmada project – contrasting the normative ‘ought’ with the 
analytical ‘is’ – was guided by philosophical ethics. It constitutes the second part of 
the pro-equity evaluation (Reynolds and Williams, 2010 pp. 129-134). The third part 
of the evaluation generated interesting issues regarding relations of power.  
 
CSH:  reflecting on boundary judgements  
 
Contrasting different stakeholder perspectives through critique can often lead to an 
unhelpful state of inertia – an entrenchment of stakeholder positioning, or literally 
‘stakeholding’.  The drive towards enabling reflective practice amongst practitioners 
in CSH can in contrast contribute to an enhanced form of developmental evaluation.  
CSH questions 3, 6, 9 and 12 relate to stakeholding development.  This third set of 
questions were originally referred to in CSH as the ‘key problems’ associated with a 
particular stakeholder group in relation to a particular system of interest.  
 
The ‘problem’ in each case is a problem of boundary judgement between a bounded 
system and the realities of the essentially unbounded situation. For sources of 
motivation the problem is how to make a bounded ‘measurement’ from the essential 
immeasurable emergent outcomes from an intervention. It questions the  politics 
behind adhering systematically to fixed targets and other expressions of performance 
indicators rather than allowing for systemic adaptation and revision of measures in 
response to feedback during interventions. 
 
For sources of control the stakeholding problem is how to exert control in an 
essentially non-controllable socio-economic-ecological environment. It brings to the 
fore issues of ‘might over right’; how much power is unduly expressed by those in 
control of resources? For sources of knowledge the stakeholding problem is how to 
give some promise of assurance that the intervention will succeed whilst 
acknowledging inevitable uncertainty. It brings to the fore issues of ‘right over 
might’; how much power is unduly expressed by experts in the particular field?  For 
sources of legitimacy, the stakeholding problem is how to affirm some sense of 
redress to the power of decision makers and experts about an intervention in a 
political environment of contested relations of power including contested meanings 
about righteousness.    Table 6 illustrates the contrasting issue of either stakeholding 
entrenchment or stakeholding development to look out for in addressing boundary 
judgements in a creative manner.  
 
  
Table 6  Stakeholding entrenchment or development  
associated with a system of interest 
 
 
 
 
Stakeholding development is a positive expression of triple-loop learning.  It 
encompasses an appreciation of risks in ‘mightiness’ (sources of control) over 
‘rightness’ (sources of knowledge) and vice versa.   CSH moves developmental 
evaluation on by recognising different stakeholder concerns regarding possible 
opportunities for stakeholder development (relating to nurturing purposeful 
negotiation), as well as signalling risks of stakeholder entrenchment (relating to 
‘positional bargaining’).   
 
Questions of stakeholding development for Narmada are addressed in the third stage 
of the pro-equity evaluation (Reynolds and Williams, 2010 pp. 134-138). 
Summary 
In an equity-focused developmental evaluation some basic systems questions might 
be asked to reveal areas of responsibility that need to be, and can be, managed more 
constructively.  Such questions are informed by critical systems thinking: 
• Interrelationships.  What are the particular issues that need attention and how 
might they be related with each other? In particular what normative values are 
involved and how might they relate to what’s at stake - (1) built-in values, (2) 
power structures, (3) expert assumptions, and (4) the moral basis on which an 
intervention operates - with the system of intervention being evaluated?  
• Perspectives. How might these issues be attended to and by whom? How in 
particular may the views of traditionally worst-off groups be given 
expression?  What opportunities exist for such expressions to be meaningfully 
engaged with in an emergent purposeful manner?  How might philosophical 
traditions of ethics, focusing not just on utility but rights and virtues, assist 
with such evaluations? 
• Boundaries.  Why are some issues privileged more than others, and some 
ways of dealing with them from particular perspectives prioritised over others?  
How pervasive are existing systems of expert-driven solutions to poverty-
alleviation, or existing systems of financial control by international lending 
agencies in partnership with national Governments, in sustaining iniquitous 
situations? How might triple-loop learning inform developmental evaluation in 
nurturing appropriate political space? 
 
CST can enhance purposeful equity-focused developmental evaluation. More 
specifically, CSH provides a pro-equity toolbox of questions – a reference system -  
for evaluating interventions with a pro-equity focus.  The CSH questions relate to an 
understanding of who gets what, in relation to who owns what and who does what. 
Such questions are viewed in further relation to who the victims (ensuing ‘worst-off 
groups’) might be in any intervention and with what justification. CSH provides a 
conceptual model – a reference system – for then critically engaging other 
perspectives.  Finally, CSH offers a means for confronting and deliberating upon 
boundary judgements in a purposeful manner. The idea is not just to enable double-
loop learning for actively changing existing systems for ethical purposes, but to 
provide triple-loop learning guidelines and alerts on the political risks of decisionism 
(might over right) or technocentrism (right over might) that circumscribes many 
interventions.   
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